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The popular perception of the performance of British armour in the Normandy campaign of 1944 is one of failure and frustration. Despite overwhelming superiority in numbers, Montgomery's repeated efforts to employ his armour in an offensive manner ended in a disappointing stalemate. Explanation of these and other humiliating failures has centred predominantly on the shortcomings of the tanks employed by British formations. This new study by John Buckley challenges the standard view of Normandy as a failure for British armour by analysing the reality and level of the supposed failure and the causes behind it.
- Sales Rank: #4010818 in Books
- Published on: 2004-09-01
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.21" h x .69" w x 6.14" l, 1.31 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 312 pages
About the Author
John Buckley is Senior Lecturer in War Studies and History at the University of Wolverhampton. He is the author of The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945: Constant Endeavour (1995) and Air Power in the Age of Total War (1998).
Most helpful customer reviews
11 of 12 people found the following review helpful.
Outstanding analysis of Montgomery's failures in Normandy
By DarthRad
I got this book nearly five years ago because I was curious about one thing - what exactly happened with the British forces in Normandy? Why did it take the British so long to slog through the German forces, when the original D-Day plans were for the British forces to have taken Caen by D-Day +2 (June 8, 1944)?
Reading this terrific book, the answers jumped out at me. The answer was quite simply the severe failure of generalship on the part of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (later Viscount Montgomery of Alamein), commander of the Allied 21st Army Group.
I've pointed this out in a few debates with Montgomery's diehard fanboys in other forums, and I am always amazed that these people failed to read the same book that I read. It is simply that Buckley takes care to just tell the facts and rarely criticizes Montgomery by name.
So, for those of you who speed read through this book and failed to see the obvious, here are the exact spots where Buckley nails Montgomery right between the eyes and pinpoints his severe failings of generalship that led to the numerous debacles and high British casualties during the Normandy campaign:
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(reprint of a reply to a Montgomery fan in the Amazon History forum - I will post the links to this debate in the Commentary section)
The proof of any military commander's greatness or incompetence are the results. And Montgomery had uniformly poor results in Western Europe, either under-performing expectations (most of the time) or engaging in outright disasters (Market Garden).
Montgomery's tight control of his subordinates had the result of thoroughly populating his 21st Army Group with subordinates who were timid yes-men, afraid to deviate from any battle plan in the face of changing circumstances. It goes without saying that in the rapid, complex, and unpredictable nature of mechanized warfare in WWII, set-piece battles RARELY went according to plan. Successful conclusions to set piece battles in fact frequently depended upon individual initiatives and the bravery of small units and their commanders who found solutions to a tough German problem.
From p.66 of British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (Military History and Policy) :
"General Alexander had already commented upon the lack of initiative and thrust on the part of subordinate commanders as early as 1942, and German opponents still noted similar traits throughout the Normandy campaign. Gen. Diestel, GOC 346th Infantry division, who arrived in Normandy on 8 June, recorded a lack of originality on the part of the British, who always followed set patterns of attack and lacked imagination and drive.
p. 57
"....a primary concern for Montgomery was maintaining firm control of unfolding battles and this required subordinates to do only that for which he had briefed them. The concept of the set-piece battle and the rigid predetermined plan was designed to ensure that little could go wrong."
And here was the problem. Montgomery's clumsy and poorly planned set piece battle plans USUALLY DID GO AWRY. And then the subordinate commanders were too timid and enured to being subjugated by Montgomery's will to attempt any creative and bold solutions to the problems on their own.
And what if the original battle plan was an outright disaster waiting to happen? That was Operation Market Garden, in a nutshell, but the roots of this incompetent tactical planning by Montgomery and his staff can be seen in Operation Goodwood, which was a disaster for the tanks of the 21st Army Group.
P. 36
"although many were later recovered, the British had lost well over 400 tanks, in excess of a third of their total frontline strength during Goodwood."
The Germans are estimated to have lost 75-100 tanks destroyed during Goodwood. A 4-1 or 5-1 loss ratio against the Germans is hardly the sign of a brilliant military commander, especially when those tanks did not even come close to achieving their final objectives, and so was as bad as or worse than what the Soviets accomplished against the Germans at Kursk.
p. 37 ***** THE SMOKING GUN PROOF OF MONTGOMERY'S TACTICAL INCOMPETENCE AT NORMANDY *****
"...the tactical considerations for British armour in Goodwood were considerable and quite alarming. Maj. Tony Sargeaunt, the tank expert attached to No. 2 Operational Research Section at 21st Army Group, was shocked when he first viewed the Goodwood plan. The final stages would be fought across a flat and open area of some 4,000 yards, which would offer the static anti-tank gunnery of the Germans a huge advantage whilst denying British armour any cover or hull-down firing positions. Allied tank guns attempting to knock out camouflaged enemy anti-tank guns needed to be at a range of some 800 yards or less to have a fair chance of rapid success. At ranges of some 2,000 yards, however, it would take Shermans and Cromwells some 15 rounds of high explosive (HE) to eliminate the target. Even with multiple tanks engaging the enemy, it was probable that four or five Allied tanks would be knocked out in the process. consequently, in the later stages of Goodwood, in the final push to the Bourguebus Ridge, Allied tanks would be at their most vulnerable just at the time when the effects of artillery and air support were likely to be diminishing."
p. 35
"Operation Goodwood also suffered unduly from poor all-arms co-ordination, partly a product of the nature of the plan, but which impacted severely on the armoured regiments...."
p.36
"...artillery support for the leading armoured units dwindled as the day went on. Moreover, air support also faded, despite the tremendous effects of the initial heavy bombardment. In part this was due to the great depth of the German Defences defeating the bombing plans of the Allied air forces, but also because the forward air controller (FAC) assigned to the 29th Armoured Brigade was badly wounded in sight of the Bourguebus Ridge and knocked out of the battle. Tactical air support from then on became sporadic and patchy, just at the crucial moment when it was most required. There is certainly a degree of misfortune over this incident, but the fact that only one FAC was allotted to the leading brigade of this major operation was a major error in judgement and planning."
In Normandy, the British-Canadian 21 Army Group was involved in multiple set piece operations - Perch, Epsom, Windsor, Charnwood, Jupiter, Goodwood, Spring, Totalise, and Tractable. Almost all of these operations came up short of completely accomplishing their planned objectives; combined together, they had the effect of steadily driving the Germans back and grinding down the numbers of German troops and armor in Normandy.
So it is only to be expected that the vain Montgomery would say that "attriting the Germans to allow the Americans to succeed" was his plan all along, when in fact the details of the original battle objectives of these operations prove him to be a liar. Had most of these operations, especially Goodwood, succeeded completely, the U.S. Operation Cobra at St. Lo, which did finally achieve the break out from Normandy that Montgomery failed to accomplish, would not have even been necessary. Ultimately, Montgomery would end up "attriting" more of his own British and Canadian forces than the German forces through sheer tactical incompetence.
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This book is well worth reading, you just need to pay attention to the fine print, and keep asking yourself - WHY? Why did things go so badly for the British at Normandy?
One of Montgomery's greatest failings, as a commander of armored forces, was his petulant relationship with his own RAF tactical air commanders, Air Marshals Tedder and Coningham, which resulted in a severely stunted and limited use of British tactical air power to support his armored forces. Today, it is a given that armored forces need air superiority and tactical air support as tanks and AFVs out in the open are highly vulnerable to attack from the air and from well placed anti-armor defenses. The U.S. Army would in Normandy quickly learn this lesson and developed tactical air support to maximal effect, often working closely with the very same RAF tactical air groups that Montgomery ignored or made little use of. Montgomery's failure to make better use of the otherwise quite excellent RAF tactical air support and his tightly scripted battle plans that allowed for no individual initiative were key factors that led to the failures in Normandy and the later disaster of Operation Market Garden
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7 of 9 people found the following review helpful.
An absolutely outstanding assessment of British armor in 1944
By Koba
The revisionist view of Allied armored operations in Normandy in 1944 is one of weakness -- the Allies had inferior armor, inferior doctrine, and less-highly motivated soldiers than the Germans -- counterbalanced by tremendous material superiority and overwhelming artillery and airpower. In particular the British are taken to task for failing to seize Caen right after the initial landings, and for failing to achieve a strategic breakout despite repeated, costly attacks. This criticism is found in B.H. Liddell Hart, Carlo D'Este, Max Hastings, and others. In this book, John Buckley provides a deeper analysis, and shows that revisionist views are incomplete, distorted, and based on the view that the British Army should have fought like the Germans despite the obvious fact that the British were not Germans.
Buckley shows that the Germans fought a different type of war from what the British expected them to fight. The British expected the Germans to fall back on prepared defenses with mobile reserves in support. However, the Germans tried to pin the Allies into the beachhead, and fed troops in piecemeal, forcing the Allies to batter their way through difficult terrain. The Allies adapted to this, in Buckley's view, successfully. Buckley also notes that even the Germans had great difficulty attacking in Normandy.
With regard to technical shortcomings, Buckley notes that most German tanks in Normandy were not much better than the Allied tanks facing them. The main British shortcoming was not lack of armored protection, but lack of firepower. However, even a tank with a highly effective gun would not necessarily have fared well on the offense against concealed, dug-in opponents; again, the Germans suffered heavy armored losses when they attacked in Normandy, even though their tanks had highly effective anti-tank weapons.
Buckley does not consider that British troops lacked morale and fortitude. In particular, the armored units had a lower level of battle exhaustion casualties than the infantry units. Furthermore, he shows that there is no convincing evidence that veteran formations had lower morale than inexperienced units. The 7th armored division performed poorly, but other veteran units performed well.
On the whole, this is an excellent book. He covers all the issues: doctrine, leadership, morale, and technical capability. In addition the book is a pleasure to read and is well-supported with factual evidence.
32 of 34 people found the following review helpful.
Full, balanced, and scholarly analysis of British armor
By Mannie Liscum
John Buckley's British Armour in the Normandy Campaign is a first rate tour de force work of military history that challenges conventional accepted wisdom that the British (and Canadian) armored forces in western France were ineffective and contributed little to the over campaign from D-Day to the Breakout. What makes Buckley's truly spectacular is the fact that he not only challenges this wisdom but uses thorough and detailed research to leave the reader with a clear picture that British armor was in fact effective and made a significant contribution within the doctrine and contexts they were employed.
British Armour in the Normandy Campaign is separated into nine logically distinct chapters:
1) Introduction - in this first chapter Buckley sets the stage of the book by introducing the aforementioned conventional wisdom and posing his thesis that this is an incorrect interpretation of the facts as told by the bigger picture. Brief discussions of several engagements are used as particular examples of how the believed ineffectiveness of British armor requires more detailed analysis. This is a very insightful chapter that sets the tone of the exceptional research and unbiased approach Buckley takes throughout the book.
2) Fighting the Campaign - In this chapter Buckley gives a lucid description of major engagements the British (and Commonwealth) armored forces took part in from June to Aug of 1944. There is also considerable discussion of the organization of the various armored forces employed and their Orders of Battle. Because Buckley's combat prose is presented from the standpoint of facts not the human component this chapter (and later battle discussions) is fairly dry reading. Yet, little is wasted on fluff and in many ways this is refreshing.
3) Operational Technique - Here Buckley presents a clear picture of the British operational doctrine and command structure. In the previous chapter combat was discussed, and in this chapter we get a sense of what British commanders were thinking and how they were trained doctrinally to think. In the following chapter these two pieces are put together.
4) Fighting the Battle - In this chapter Buckley discusses the engagements introduced in the second chapter within the context of doctrine and command (discussed in the previous chapter). In doing so Buckley paints a fuller and more critical picture of the British armor and their actions in Normandy.
5) The Tank Gap - Any discussion of armored actions are incomplete without a critical analysis of opponent capabilities. Again conventional wisdom is that the British (and Allies in general) were significantly out gunned, out armored, and tactically deficient when compared to the Germans. While the German armor had many features superior to those of the Allies this commonly held view is naïve. Buckley clears the air on this topic very well and thoroughly. As should be pointed out in ALL discussions of armored clashes in northwestern Europe in the first couple of months following the invasion, a phenomenon Buckley terms "Tiger-phobia" is probably most responsible for the prevailing wisdom of Allied armor inferiority. In particular, most accounts of armored battles in Normandy point to the overwhelming power of Tiger and Panther tanks when in fact the tank most often encountered by Allied armor was the similarly shaped (but much smaller) Panzer Mark IV. The fear of Tigers and Panthers created a mystique related to German armor that has survived 60 plus years! Certainly these latter two AFVs (armored fighting vehicles) were fearsome machines but they suffered from many shortcomings. Moreover, there were simply too few of them deployed. In addition to clearing the air on this important topic, Buckley does a fair and balanced job describing the strengths and weaknesses of Allied armor. Additionally he makes a clear case that a less than ideal and relatively weak AFV does not therefore make a machine unable to win battles if employed within proper doctrinal boundaries. This chapter is quite amazing!
6) Design and Planning - This chapter continues the discussion of the previous chapter but explores the issue of armor, less from a technical standpoint (e.g. who's gun was bigger, who's armor less protective, etc.) and more from a logistics and strategic one. This is essential information for the reader as it places the study within a doctrinal context and the mindset of the command staff. Without knowing how the British came to the decisions they did about armor design, employment and improvement one can not fully appreciate the bigger picture - the British armor was effective and significant to the Allied offensive.
7) Production and Supply - This chapter is a logical extension of the previous chapter and explains much about why particular AFVs (e.g., the M4 Sherman) was employed en masse when potentially superior machines (e.g., A27M Cromwell) were part of the Allied repertoire. This chapter, like the previous one, is essential to gain a fair picture of the British armor in Normandy.
8) Morale and Motivation - This chapter addresses the human factor that makes or breaks any military unit: the solider, or in this case tankers and AFV fighting troops (including armored infantry). Once again Buckley questions a conventional wisdom: namely that British armored troops in Normandy exhibited poor morale and little will to fight. While there are certainly cases of poor morale and a fair number of AWOL and desertions cases the picture is not as simple as the tail of numbers. Again Buckley provides the larger pool of facts necessary to draw fair conclusions.
9) Conclusion - In the final chapter Buckley provides a concise summary of the questions at hand and the answers presented. Very nice ending to a fabulous book.
In the final analysis Buckley's British Armour in the Normandy Campaign is a wonderful read. Few historical works present a clear thesis that is followed through on in such a thorough fashion with fairness and virtual lack of bias. This book represents a guide for how this type of historical work should be approached. 5 HUGE stars!!!
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